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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXVII JUNE, 1942 NUMBER 4
THE FALSE STANDARD IN ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDUREI
CARL MCFARLAND
If we are to think clearly in the field of administrative law and procedure,
we must select and disclose our standards, tests, and weapons of criticism.
The necessity of such a course is so obvious that, to say so, seems trite; but to
follow such a course is fiovel. The situafon is not the less amazing in view
of the vast flow of literature and speech in this field. This literary and orator-
ical output has actually done very little more than fill out the programs of bar
associations and supply the periodical needs of law journals. Indeed, so much
fuss has been made that general legislation has actually passed the Congress
in response to a vague feeling that something must be done, and that any-
thing is better than nothing.'
I
The general literature of the subject is concocted of a few standard in-
gredients. Distilled of elegant verbiage, most "liberal" writings come to one
or both of two standard propositions:
(1) Conceding (at least for the sake of argument) that the Constitution
and laws should, in the last analysis and in most types of cases, be applied
and enforced by the courts, nevertheless the necessary freedom of ad-
ministrative agencies is endangered by judicial control-so that the courts
must exercise their jurisdiction very sparingly.2
(2) Administrative justice is both necessary and good because it is
(a) inexpensive, (b) efficient, and (c) can encompass those things which
are beyond the practical or constitutional realm of legislative and judicial
competence.3
tA lecture delivered at the Cornell Law School under the Frank Irvine Lecture-
ship of the Phi Delta Phi Foundation, February 21, 1942. [Ed.]1H. R. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. For the veto message and accompanying docu-
ment, see H. R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1941).2The recent federal Committee on Administrative Procedure took the position
that, while judicial review should be, and is, "fairly limited," nevertheless the courts
make the rules of review in any event so that the present system guarantees against
any potential administrative abuses. Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies-Report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure Appointed by
the Attorney General at the Request of the President, to Investigate the Need for
Procedural Reforn in Various Administrative Tribunals and to Suggest Improve-
inents Therein, SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), 75 et seq.
sId. at 11 et seq.
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Although some writings examine details or particular aspects of these general
themes, articles (and even whole books) add to these propositions little more
than a luxuriant foliage of citations, quotations, footnotes, and deft phrases.
It is true that a more limited group of writers and speakers (who, however,
express the feelings of large segments of business and professional people) do
not accede to these statements of general theory and, instead, write and speak
in terms of two propositions similar in subject matter but quite different in
viewpoint and emphasis, as follows:
(1) The Constitution is in danger unless rigorously applied in all
cases and in detail by the courts ;4 and, as a corollary, all statutory powers
must be similarly applied ;5
(2) Administrative agencies are, or tend to be, arbitrary, capricious,
and unjust in their operations-at least unless held within rigidly narrow
limits by judicial restraint. 6
4That "the constitution must be looked into by the judges," in the words of Chief
Justice Marshall, "is of the very essence of judicial duty" for to permit otherwise
"would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions." Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 179 (1803).5So far as interpretation of administrative authority in the United States is con-
cerned, "the custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges." CARDozo, NA-
TUE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 135. "And without having recourse to any
of the elementary writers, or to the popular conventions of Europe, we have a most
commanding authority in the sense of the American people, that the right to inter-
pret laws does, and ought to belong exclusively to the courts of Justice," Kent, C.,
in Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477, 509 (N. Y. 1811). "Obviously, if the execu-
tive could determine its own competence, it would, in fact, be the master of the legal
imperatives by which it lives. By entrusting the decision of such disputes to a body
outside the executive, an independent assessment of validity can be obtained." LAsKI,
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS (1931) 62. In the forum of the courts, it has been said,
"the individual may assert his rights; there the government must accept definition of
its authority. There the individual may challenge the legality of governmental
action and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test
the government must abide.' WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNI ENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (1911) 142.
Attempts to do away with judicial interpretation of the statutory authority of
administrative officers caused great outcry in England fairly recently. See: ALLEN,
BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT (1931) 62 et seq.; HEWART, THE NEW DEsPOTIs
(1929); MARoTr, THE CRIsis OF ENGLISH LIBERTY (1930), 1-18; WILLIS, THE PAR-
LIAMENTARY POWERS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933). This resulted in
the appointment of a special commission of inquiry. REPORT, COMMITTEE ON MINISTER'S
PowERs (1932) London.
- But compare a more recent view of the majority of the federal Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure to the effect that "this is not to say that the courts must always sub-
stitute their own interpretations for those of the administrative agencies. Their review
may, in some instances at least) be limited to the inquiry whether the administrative
construction is a reasonable one." Op. cit. supra note 2, p. 78. and see also pp. 90-91.
See also the recent statement of the Supreme Court to the effect that "the function of
review ... is fully performed when they determine that there has been ... an application
of the statute in a just and reasoned manner." Gray v. Powell et al., - U. S. -- 62 Sup.
Ct. 326 (1941).
6"What we cannot say of administrative power in general [that it is permissible with
proper personnel] we can say of discretionary administrative power over individual
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There are, of course, a good many variations in emphasis as between different
speakers and writers on these latter themes.
A third and more limited group of writings explores some particular phase
of administrative justice-such as the application of the rules of evidence, or
the administration of some particular statute. But even these-though it is
not aways apparent to the casual reader-almost always, if they are to any
extent critical, pursue their discussion upon a background, or upon assumed
standards of judgment, in accord with one or the other of the foregoing points
of view.
Amid this welter of words-this vast bibliography-it is necessary to pick
a way very carefully in order to discover a more tangible and useful course of
thought and action in this field. Neither of the viewpoints set forth above has
ever been wholly accepted in practice, even by its proponents. They are not
really standards, but represent merely general convictions or fashions in
thinking.
II
Out of the general attitudes on the subject, however, there has developed
a series of approaches which have become somewhat more specific. They
illustrate not merely the interesting search for a standard of criticism but also
a gratifying attempt to get to the roots of the problem-or at least to so much
of the problem as may seem to be subject to profitable study and action.
(1) The first awareness of administrative justice naturally gave rise to
consideration whether there was a place for such an institution in the
American system.1 Here, too, there were two general propositions for debate:
rights, namely that it is undesirable per se and should be avoided so far as may be, for
discretion is unstandardized power and to lodge in an official such power over person
or property is hardly conformable to the 'Rule of Law."' FREUND, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINisTRAiv LAW (1923) 22-23.
"The function of an administrative body is to get something done, not to adjudicate con-
troversies nor to mark out and delimit rights .... It must seek a practical solution of
one case rather than a rule for all cases; and this requires that its determinations...
must be subject ultimately to the check of an adjudicating body primarily interested in
general rules of delimitation between opposing rights." DICKINSON, ADmiNiSTRATrIVE JUs-
TICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) 235.
In England where the rights of Englishmen were long ago put forward by the courts
against the royal power, it is now urged that this function is no less important as a pro-
tection against the popular executive. HEWART, THE NEv DEsPoTIsM (1919) Ch. VII.
"Let us not think of the bureaucrat as an octopus ever reaching his tentacles for more
and more absolute powers. He is both efficient and disinterested; we are proud of our
Judges in England, and we have as good reason to be proud of our Civil Service. But
it is exactly from the executive officer's efficiency and zeal that we must save ourselves-
and him. His business is to get things done. He knows best what is to be done and the
most convenient means of doing it; he is the expert, with special means of knowledge
at his command; and when principles of law are put in his way, he is apt to be impa-
tient of them as mere pedantic obstructions." ALLEN, BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT (1931)
59, 60.
7Even today, "when the term 'administrative law' is used, the real subject is not ordi-
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(a) Whether administrative justice could exist validly within the constitutional
and legal system of the United States, and (b) whether, irrespective of its
legality, it was a desirable development. The former was answered by history
-since there had always been some degree of administrative justice in the
federal and state governments 8 -and by the necessities created by the ex-
panded scope of governmental functions which came after the Civil War.9
The latter proposition-the question whether administrative justice, if legal,
was a good thing-resulted in much declamation during the last decade of the
nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, of which we still hear echoes
from time to time. But since the institution was apparently valid under the
Constitution,' ° and regarded as a necessary instrument of expanded govern-
ment, those who argued its abstract desirability found themselves almost
literally crying in the wilderness."
(2) Thereupon, particularly after the first World War, a new and somewhat
more specific ground of debate developed in the problem of the relation of
narily the law of administration but the institution or system of having the forms of law ap-
plied by administrative agencies." McFarland, Administrative Law--Its Symptoms and
Diagnosis, 1939 GA. BAR Ass'x REP. 263.
8"The practice of public officers exercising powers over persons and property is older
than our form of government and has been with us always-the governor, the tax
gatherer, the public prosecutor, the customs agent, the land commissioner, the local
constable, and a host of others. Old and new precedents on their powers are accumulated
in our standard law books under the heading of "Public Officers" or are scattered among
diverse subjects. The public prosecutor-the district attorney, county attorney, state's
attorney, or municipal solicitor--exercises, for example, unparalleled power to prosecute
or to withhold the penalties of the law, to persecute the innocent or protect the guilty;
but his powers are so ancient and accepted that they pass almost unnoticed." Op. cit.
supra, note 7. See also op. cit. supra, note 2, at 7 et seq.9The courts very early recognized the necessities: "The sound construction of the
Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the
means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it." Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). In the words of Chief Justice Taft, "the inevi-
table progress and exigencies of government and utter inability [of the legislative branch]
to give time and attention indispensable to the exercise of these powers in detail forced
the modification of the rule." Proceedings on the Death of Chief Justice White, 257 U. S.
v, xxv-xxvi (1922).
'
0The literature on the subject deals with the incidence of the constitutional system
upon administration rather than the validity of administrative justice per se. One of the
few articles which attempts a survey of constitutional limitations upon administrative
agencies is Judge Cuthbert Pound's Constitutional Aspects of Administrative Law, which
is one of the chapters in'GRoWTH OF ATAERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923), reprinted
in 9 A. B. A. J. 409. Another is judge Rosenberry's Administrative Law and the Con-
stitution (1929), 23 Am. POL. ScI. Rav. 32. See also McFarland, Administrative Agen-
cies i Government and the Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, 59 A. B. A.
RE'. 326 (1934).
11"The symptoms of administrative justice which critics mention may be grouped in
three classes: (1) the number and character of the public officers involved, (2) the
powers they wield, and (3) the methods by which they proceed with their tasks."
Op. cit. supra note 7.
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administrative agencies to the regular courts. 2 For, while administrative
justice had become recognized as a valid institution, it was not autonomous.
Its judgments were subject, in most instances, to judicial scrutiny to some
degree. Although the problem had been sketched long before, the decade of
the 1920's was given over almost entirely to a debate upon the proper scope
of judicial review of administrative action.' 3 Then, for a short while, a special
court of review was advocated' 4 as a compromise between the competing ideas
12 Compare: "One of the most persuasive arguments against a too generous employ-
ment of the right to a judicial review is the fact that courts are not equipped to review
findings of fact in many technical fields. .. . On the other hand, an unintelligent, im-
properly equipped administrative body, ignorant of fundamental legal principles may by
its findings and orders do such great injustice that one who suffers therefrom ought,
according to the conceptions of justice which obtain among Anglo-American peoples,
to be entitled to have them reviewed. Here we come to an impasse in the development
of administrative law under our constitutional system. . . ." Rosenberry, Administrative
Law and the Constitution, 23 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 32, 44 (1929). "The need for a co-
herent system of administrative law, for uniformity and despatch in adjudication, for
the subtle skill required in judges called upon to synthesize the public and private
claims peculiarly involved in administrative litigation, these and kindred considerations
will have to be balanced against the traditional hold of a single system of courts, giving
a generalized professional aptitude to its judges and bringing to the review of administra-
tive conduct a technique and a temperament trained in litigations between private indi-
viduals." FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927)
184-186.
It is important to keep in mind that here "judicial review" involves several things: (1)
the popular demand for a right of appeal of some sort, (2) the professional demand for
a right of appeal to judicial tribunals, (3) statutory judicial powers over administration,
and (4) judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States and the constitu-
tions of the several states. Of the popular demand for some appeal, it has been said that
"in the estimation of English-speaking people generally a right of review is no less
sacred than the right to be heard in the first instance." Rosenberry (Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Wisconsin), Administrative Law and the Constitution, 23 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 32, 41 (1929).
13 For the literature of this period, see for example: Albertsworth, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action by the Supreme Court, 35 HAv. L. REv. 127 (1921) ; Dicmisou,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw (1927) ; FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) 285-299; Freund, Substitution of Rule
for Discretion in Public Law, 9 Am. PoL. ScI. REV. 666 (1915) ; Grimm, Administrative
Detemninations, 3 ST. Louis L. REV. 140 (1919) ; Hankin, Conchsiveiess of the Federal
Trade Commission Findings as to Facts, 23 MIcH. L. REV. 233, 233-237 (1925) ; Mc.
FARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTER-
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1933); Powell, Conchsiveness of Administrative De-
terminations in the Federal Government, 1 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 583 (1907) ; Tennant,
Administrative Finality, 6 CAN. BAR REv. 497 (1928) ; Tollefson, Administrative Finality,
29 MICH. L. REv. 839 (1931) ; Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings, 30
YALE L. J. 781 (1921) ; Powell, Administrative Exercise of Legislative and Judicial
Power, 27 POL. Sc. Q. 215 (1912), 28 Id. 34, 34-35 (1913) ; Berle, Expansion of Ailwri-
can Administrative Law, 39 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1917) ; Pillsbury, Administrative Tri-
bunals, 36 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1923). For recent views on the same subject, see op. cit.
supra, note 2, at 75 et seq., 209 et seq., and Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Adminis-
trative Law, 89 PA. L. REV. 1026 (1941).
14A measure "to establish a United States Court of Administrative Justice and to ex-
pedite the hearing and determination of controversies with the United States" was in-
troduced in the Senate, May 29, 1933. S. 1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. See also S. 3676
introduced in the 75th Congress (1937-1938).
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of specialization and a more complete judicial control. Soon, however, the
former debate regarding judicial-administrative relations was resumed and
,reached its climax in the recent passage of a measure by the Congress which
was principally designed to specify the scope and subject matter of judicial
review.15
But even while these matters were being agitated, the conviction began to
grow that judicial review, of itself, could not solve the problem. While some
clarification of judicial review has come to be agreed upon as one of the
desirable items in any general administrative legislation,' 6 nevertheless, as a
practical matter it is available and can operate only in a limited class of cases.
In the first place, comparatively few people, though adversely affected by ad-
ministrative action, reach the point where they may even consider seeking
judicial review. After they have unsuccessfully applied to an agency, or been
the subject of affirmative administrative action, they must decide whether to
submit to the first judgment of the agency or ask a reconsideration. They, or
their counsel, must find and study the substantive and procedural law-in
statutes, rules, and rulings. They must decide whether they can afford a
hearing. They may have to decide whether they can afford a rehearing. Only
after they have passed through these and other stages of the administrative
process are they accorded an opportunity for judicial review. Even then, many
factors foreclose judicial review, no matter how specific the Congress has been
in granting it or how generous the courts may be fn exercising it. In some
fields, judicial power, even where review exists, does not afford full relief,' 7
and in many fields judicial review comes too late.' 8 In others, factors of cost,
1Sp. cit. supra note 1; op. cit. sopra note 2, at 214.
'
6See, for example, op. cit. supra note 2, at 92, 209-212; and Hearings, Sub-commlittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, on S. 674, 675, and 918, Pt. III, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pp. 1437-1438, 1452.
'
7
"In none of the situations in which an action of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion or of a similar federal regulatory body comes for scrutiny before a federal court
can judicial action supplant the discretionary authority of a commission. A federal court
cannot fix rates nor make divisions of joint rates nor relieve from the long-short haul
clause nor formulate car practices." Federal Power Comm'n v. Pacific Co., 307 U. S. 156,
160, 59 Sup. Ct. 766, 768 (1939).
'
8 1n many cases "business transactions cannot wait upon the exigencies of appeal ***
Time is of the essence." Wheli the Securities and Exchange Commission issues a stop
order or delists a security, later reversal by a court may show the Commission to have
been in error, but it cannot recapture the transactions which the Commission's action
prevented. Again, "whether the Securities and Exchange Commission on final considera-
tion will actually decide to enter a stop order is interesting, but not very important; for
only a rare investor would purchase securities from an issuer threatened with the ad-
ministrative bar. When the Securities and Exchange Commission actually delists a
security, the news is important; but the market drops when the order for hearing is
announced." Lane, Address, Association of American Law Schools, Handbook of Pro-
ceedings, Thirty-sixth Annual Meeting (1938) 199.
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time, the wear and tear of litigation, and fear of imagined regulatory reprisals
effectively dissuade the disappointed citizen.
Moreover, neither the availability of judicial review, nor its formal scope,
touches a more vital matter-that is, the subject matter of judicial review. The
courts hear no witnesses, but merely examine a paper record. By what process
was' that record made? For example, neither the Constitution nor the statutes
from which the courts derive their powers of review prescribe what constitutes
adequate notice. Neither specify the many phases of a fair hearing. What
shall the administrative record, to which the review is confined, contain?
Since the rules of evidence have been abolished generally in administrative
trials, what has taken their place? Neither the Constitution, nor the statutes,
nor the administrative agencies, nor the courts have specified. Manifestly,
without recognizable and available rules and principles for administrative pro-
cedure, the courts must operate in a decidedly artificial manner when they re-
view an administrative trial. The point is that the availablity and scope of
review, of which so much has been said and written, are, after all, empty
subjects so long as basic administrative procedure is without character.' 9
(3) We come, then, to the third and most recent stage of study and
activity-administrative procedure. Partly out of recognition of the real
substance of the problem, partly to avoid undue expansion of judicial review
through legislative action, and partly because of recently and rapid expansion
in the realm of federal administration which has driven home bluntly the
methods and operation of administrative agencies, attention has been turned
to the principles and details, the needs and inefficiencies, the virtues and in-
justices of the actual operation of the administrative system in the federal
government 20  In the states the same problem is being felt.21
'
9See the final report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure: "Dissatisfac-
tion with the existing standards as to the scope of judicial review derives largely from
dissatisfaction with the fact-finding procedures now employed by the administrative
bodies." Op. cit. stipra note 2, at 92. To the same effect: "The need for review of
questions of fact is less if the machinery for the determination of facts inspires confi-
dence; it is greater if it does not." Bell, Let Me Find the Facts, 26 A. B. A. J. 552, 553
(1940).2 0 The chief effort in this line was the work of the recent federal Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure which was created at the suggestion of Attorney General Homer
Cummings who, in 1938, suggested to the President "a most thorough survey of existing
practices and procedure" to pave the way for the elimination of deficiencies "and point
the way to improvements in the [administrative] process which will make it so service-
able and just that it will command the respect, and enjoy the support, of all other
branches of the Government and of the public at large." Op. cit. sipra. note 2, at 251. Out
of this suggestion grew the appointment of a committee, the publication of a series of
studies, a final report, and proposals for general legislation. Chiefly significant was the
act of this committee in concentrating attention upon the whole of the actual operations of
administrative justice rather than confining its work to the examination of generalities
or discussion of 'a spectacular link or two in the long chain which constitutes the adminis-
trative procedural process.2 1 North Dakota has a new statute. One was recently agitated in New York. A fact-
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
This phase of the history of the subject is two-fold: First, it is recognized
that procedure must be treated apart from substance, since the latter is too
elusive and volatile to attempt to do more than set in order the methods by
which it is made (through rules and regulations) and administered.22
Second, current thought and study involve a consideration of the adequacy and
fairness of the steps, stages, and details of the administrative process itself.
Thus, for the first time in half a century of almost constant discussion, atten-
tion has been turned to the actual methods of operation of a going system of
administratfve justice-just as, periodically, attention heretofore has been
turned to the procedural methods of courts.23
III
At least for the moment, then, the problem of administrative law is a
problem of procedure. But, in so limiting the subject, we are still faced
with the necessity of building that procedure upon some theory or basis, with
some standard for thought and criticism. As to the actual and operative
finding study is being conducted in North Carolina and Ohio, and one has just been
completed in New York (see ADMINISTRATION ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Report to Governor, 1942).2 2 The law of contracts, property, injuries, and crimes has been written into statutes and
codes; and perhaps, in some unforeseeably distant day, the various subjects of administra-
tive law may be similarly treated-just as equity, the administrative justice of some cen-
turies ago, has come to rest in the general body of the law. But today, when Congress
creates an administrative agency, it specifies the law only by laying down prohibitions
or stating the objectives which the agency is to attempt to attain, in very general phrases.
These statutory provisions, together with such rules, policies, and precedents as the
agency itself may devise from time to time, constitute the body of the law relating to
railroads or pensions or securities, as the case may be. For the most part, moreover,
this "law" is changing, sometimes from day to day, since the very purpose of administra-
tive regulation is to give meaning and life to subjects so new and devious as to defy
the traditional methods of legislation and administration. If it were otherwise, Con-
gress would state the law in statutes; the courts would administer it in cases, with ex-
planatory statements in the form of opinions; and, in such form, it would be collected
and compiled, as other law. See McFarland, A Code of Administrative Procedure, 221
ANN. Am. ACAD. POL. Sci. 160.
2 3As a matter of fact, the original recommendation for the creation of the recent
federal Committee on Administrative Procedure was expressly made as a part of the
movement which included "the reform of the civil procedure for the District Courts of
the United States .... An exhaustive study was made by a representative group of the
bar, appointed by the Supreme Court as an advisory committee, which was assisted in
its work by representatives of the Department of Justice. The result has greatly sim-
plified procedure in the handling of civil cases in the federal district courts and the
appeals therefrom, substituting for the diverse, cumbersome, and obsolescent prac-
tice, theretofore obtaining, a uniform system that apparently has met with nation-wide
acclaim. Efforts are now under way to bring into harmony with the spirit of this simpli-
fied judicial procedure the review, in the several Circuit Courts of Appeals, of orders
and decisions rendered by administrative boards, agencies, and commissions. Thus, it
is particularly timely that attention be turned to the procedure employed by the ad-
ministrative process." Op. cit. supra, note 2, at 250-251. See also the SELECTED PAPERS OF
HOMER CUMMINGS (Swisher ed. 1939) p. 200 and p. 181 et seq.
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organization and methods of administrative agencies, such thought and
criticism have been almost wholly comparative. While there has been
some tendency, particularly in connection with administrative rule
making, to compare the administrative process with the legislative
process,24 for the most part the whole field is instinctively held up to the
familiar pattern of the common law and its courts.25  Accordingly, im-
plicit in most thinking on the subject is the pervading judicial pattern of
all our institutions.26
24For an indication of the inappropriateness of such a comparison, see op. cit. supra
note 2, at 101-102.
26At least one critic has pointed out that the report of the recent federal Committee
on Administrative Procedure (op. cit. supra note 2) reflects a preoccupation with "a
judicialized type of proceeding" and "a general concept of a judicialized administrative
procedure." Davidson, Administrative Technique-the Report on Administrative Proce-
dure, 41 COL. L. REv. 628, 637 (1941).
An even more basic fallacy in this approach, not treated above in the text, is the
pitfalls of attempting to discuss the institution or desirability per se of administrativejustice in terms of common law history. Undoubtedly this approach served a very use-
ful purpose thirty years ago when the subject was first broached (see the classic articles
by Dean Pound entitled Justice According to Law, 13 COL. L. R~v. 696 [1913], 14 id. 1,
103 [1914]) since people then could hardly be expected to understand any other kind of
language. Naturally, the first discussions required a comparison with the traditional sys-
tem in broad terms. Indeed, Dean Pound was quick to recognize the inapplicability ofjudicial processes to many fields of government. "In the nineteenth century the United
States developed a system of judicial interference with administration. Law paralyzing
administration was an everyday spectacle. . . .A reaction from the extreme limitations
of administration in our traditional polity, accelerated by the demands of an expanding
law of public utilities .. . resulted in a rapid development of administrative bodies of
all kinds. .. ." "A better adjustment between law and administration is needed. ... We
have tried . . . to extend law to matters not suitable for judicial justice, and thus have
tied down administration too rigidly." Id., 14 COL. L. REv. 1, 12, 22, 23. Nevertheless, the
notion has persisted that the sole standard is whether the administrative system is com-
pletely imitative of the judicial system, and when this idea is used to discuss the desir-
ability of one over the other, the resulting debate is well illustrated in judge Frank's
recent article amusingly entitled When 'Omer Smote 'Is Bloomin" Lyre, 51 YALE L. J.
367 (1942).2 6
"For example, some presidents have been prone to give the executive arm a com-
pletely deliberative character. The cabinet itself is a holdover from the day when gov-
ernor and council were both an upper 'house of legislation and a court of final appeal.
An interesting example of the tendency to make administration judicial was President
Taft's order setting up a presidential court to determine the much-mooted question under
the pure food laws, 'What is whiskey?' * * * Hearings, The Meaning of the Term
'Whiskey' (1909) 1243, 1266; Food and Drug Acts Decisions (1914) 818, 831. A purely
executive task was thus simply and easily transformed into solemn judicial procedure.
"Even our legislatures have turned more and more to formal hearings of interested
parties, with specific legislation as the res in julico. In the new House Office Building
at Washington this tendency is typified, for example, in the magnificent chamber of
the Committee on Ways and Means, where its members sit at a semicircular bench,
indistinguishable from a courtroom." Op. cit. supra note 7.
The borrowing of judicial personnel and forms for service even in military situations
is illustrated in the appointment of a commission, headed by a justice of the Supreme
Court, "to investigate and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese
armed forces upon Pearl Harbor." Attack upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed
Forces, SEN. Doc. 159, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
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Administrators and executives, instinctively it seems, turn to the formal
methods of the courts of justice. Secretaries, administrators, examiners,
commissioners, or board members sit in the judgment seats. Following
the example of appellate court structure, there is an assumption that
administrative authorities should have a plural, form, rather than be
guided by a single administrator. Notices, summonses, charges, and com-
plaints are issued. Lawyers present documents, examine witnesses, and
make arguments. Findings are made and opinions are rendered. On re-
view in the regularly constituted courts, this whole process is searched
again and arguments of substance and procedure are canvassed. It is
small wonder, therefore, that the details of administrative justice are
either modeled after, or compared with, the more familiar habits of the
judiciary. Indeed, this imitation of judicial manners has served to call
attention even to customary and traditional administrative functions, and
has subtly raised the question whether powers exercised in form so judi-
cial ought not, in fact, either be intrusted to regularly constituted courts
or at least patterned more completely in the image of the judiciary.
This imitation, conscious or unconscious, is undoubtedly the response
to several types of impulse: First, the Congress itself, when specifying
procedure as to particular agenIcies, is led naturally to use the familiar
language of the judicial code and the procedural precepts of constitu-
tional law. Secad, some administrators may fear that unless they adopt
judicial forms, those forms will be forced upon them through judicial
decisions delivered in the course of judicial review. Third, administrators
may, independently of statute, adopt such forms either out of conviction
as to their essential merit or from the very reasonable belief that tradi-
tional forms will be more readily accepted by those who are subject to
the administrative process.
By and large, of course, the judicial system reflects fundamentals
,which are not merely accepted but which are necessary in any civilized
system. These must be preserved, not because they are judicial but be-
cause they are fundamental. But the point is that any thoughtless aping
of judicial forms has drawbacks as well as virtues. The drawbacks are
of two kinds: First, not all of the general plan of judicial organization
or procedure is applicable to the administrative process. Second, some
phases of the judicial process are as arbitrary and unjust, in a civilized
world, as any arbitrary or capricious action which was ever imagined to
be characteristic of the administrative process.
It is, therefore, the blind acceptance of the judicial standard that is
a false standard when applied to administrative justice. In any last
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analysis the problem of administrative justice is to be just. If administra-
tive justice is merely designed to imitate judicial forms, then there is
no need for administrative justice27  It is indeed a cruel type of intelli-
gence which would justify administrative injustice upon the ground that
courts and judges do likewise. Aside from the frailties of men, even
though they are judges, our judicial system is in good part the result
of historical happenstance which may, because of habit if nothing more,
suffice in its own field. Transplanted into the administrative system, how-
ever, many judicial methods become aggravated anachronisms.
While space does not permit any attempt at an exhaustive list of judi-
cial methods which are inapplicable to the administrative field, it is easily
illustrated that some of the general characteristics of court organization
and method have no place i'n the executive branch of the government.
Four examples will suffice:
2 7There is no doubt of authority to establish "legislative" courts pursuant to the
exercise of legislative powers other than the power ".to constitute tribunals inferior
to the Supreme Court." See: Ex Parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 49 Sup. Ct.
411 (1929) ; Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. Ray. 894 (1930). There is no
reason why many functions now exercised by administrative agencies may not be vested
in specialized courts similar to the Court of Claims, the former Court of Private Land
Claims, or the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Historically, the common law in
the course of time has taken over whole fields of administrative or executive justice.
"Equity, both at Rome and in England, began as executive justice.... The equity made
in the Court of Chancery and the law as to misdemeanors made in the Star Chamber
became parts of our legal system. The common law survived and the sole permanent
result of the reversion to justice without law was a liberalizing and modernizing of the
law." Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COL. L. REv. 1, 19, 21 (1914). The develop-
ment of an administrative law is "no more radical than that which took place when
the Court of Chancery developed the principles of equity to mitigate -the harshness
and severity of medieval common law." Cuthbert Pound, Constitutional Aspects of
Administrative Law, GROWTH oF AmERiCAN ADMINisRaATxw LAW (1923) 130-131.
"There is really nothing in the ... division of jurisdiction more repugnant to English
notions than in the division of our own jurisdiction into Common Law and Equity.
Both, in the course of time, have become merely a matter of machinery." AILEN, BUREAU-
cRAcY TRIUMPHANT (1931) 54. "There is no reason why the administrative law of the
future should not be regularized and developed as part of the ordinary legal system of
the land." Id. at 98-99.
Courts, too, have long performed tasks which are essentially administrative. They
manage estates of deceased persons, raise children, naturalize citizens, oversee industrial
concerns which are financially embarrassed, measure the precious waters in the arid
West, participate in local inquiries as to the peace of the community, and make rules
of procedure. These customary duties, if they presented themselves as new today, might
be handed over to a department or board. It is sometimes said that administrative agen-
cies specialize and that they also take care of a tremendous load which courts could not
add to their present burdens; but there may be and are specialized courts, and enough
courts could be created to handle the job of administrative adjudication.
"Why then, do we have administrative as distinguished from judicially administered
justice, and how do they differ? The distinctions hang on slender threads. In essence,
the question is a war between the advocates of two supposedly different types of per-
sonnel. Courts are almost always manned by lawyers; administrative agencies often are
not." Op. cit. sipra note 7.
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First, and foremost, there is a necessity for the administrative arm
itself to set out, publish, and keep accurate currently a public statement
of its own organization and procedure. There is no comparable need
for courts to do so because their organization, jurisdiction, and proce-
dures28 are almost entirely set forth in statutes. Yet administrative agen-
cies, whose organization and procedure are hardly mentioned in the
statutes, almost universally fail to compile (at least for public use) their
organizational set-ups, and often fail to specify their procedures.2 9  This
lack, while simple, is fundamental because, without knowledge of where
to turn, the citizen in many cases is denied any recourse whatever. No
single factor in the administrative system causes so much pain and anguish
to the untutored citizen whether he be lawyer or layman3 0
Second, while in name each agency is a single board or commission
or administrator, an agency is actually hundreds or thousands of people.
There is, therefore, a necessity for subdelegation of authority by board
members or chief administrators. That delegation-which is not a general
characteristic of judicial procedure-takes place whether authorized or
not. It must be permitted, for otherwise board members or chief adminis-
trators would have to pass upon all the vast volume of matters within
their jurisdiction-which, of course, is simply impossible and leads to
harmful subterfuge.31 At the same time, subdelegation must be published,
2 8This does not include the recent departure from custom in connection with the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although even there the rules are but a fraction
of the law as embodied in the Judicial Code. Most court rules are merely a few pages
or even a few paragraphs, and obviously administrative rules of practice have been
drafted by individuals who, originally at least, thought of nothing except to parallel
in scope and form the familiar rules of some county or state court. The Federal Trade
Commission Rules are an excellent example. The new rules of the United States
Maritime Commission were drafted with a copy of the Federal Rules as a model,
regardless of the vast differences in problem and purpose. The original rules of the
Bituminous Coal Commission were copied for the most part from those of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission regardless of meaning or applicability and doubtless the
Interstate Commerce Commission rules originated in some lawyer's attempt fifty years
or so ago to reproduce, in form at least, the rules of a state or federal court.
290p. cit. supra note 2 at 25 et seq. See also, for example, Davison, Administrative
Technique-the Report on Administrative Procedure, 41 COL. L. REv. 628, 630-631 (1941).30
"Such a state of affairs will at least partially explain a number of types of criti-
cisms of the administrative process. Where necessary information must be secured through
oral discussion or inquiry, it is natural that parties should complain of 'a government of
men.' Where public regulation is not adequately expressed in rules, complaints regard-
ing 'unrestrained delegation of legislative authority' are aggravated. Where the process of
decision is not clearly outlined, charges of 'star-chamber proceedings' may be anticipated.
Where the basic outlines of a fair hearing are not affirmatively set forth in procedural
rules, parties are less likely to feel assured that opportunity for such a hearing is
afforded." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 25.31
"Four of the characteristics of administrative agencies, then, are their size,, their
specialization, their responsibility for results, and their variety of duties. Each of
these characteristics to a greater or less degree, in turn, contributes to, and necessitates,
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so that citizens having business with an agency will know of it; and it
must be limited to permit recourse to higher officers in proper cases a2
This problem is peculiarly administrative; the judicial pattern yields no
sufficient guide. Yet little, if anything, has been done to ease the difficul-
ties. It seems to be assumed that, since the courts have no such problem,
the administrative arm, perforce, is also without it.
Third, unlike courts except in the recent judicial development of pre-
trial procedure, administrative agencies should develop informal methods
of disposing of cases where parties consent and where, therefore, elaborate
procedures are both unnecessary and time-consuming. Routine matters
may often be dealt with informally, with the ready and even eager con-
sent of the parties. But too often administrators, assuming the awe-
inspiring aloofness of courts, are reluctant to bend to informal methods. 33
Here, in a most vital sector of administration, judicial forms furnish no
guides and the administrative method has developed only slightly, ex-
cept for the halting attempts of a few agencies in recent years.
Fourth, because of the need to subdelegate at least part of the functions
of administrative agencies in practically all cases, the actual process of
decision must be revised to recognize and regularize the participation
of subordinate officers. The anonymity of those subordinates who parti-
cipate in the decision process, the lack of knowledge on the part of those
affected as to who makes the recommendations or writes the decisions,
is productive not only of distrust of the system but of a procedural hiatus
in which the parties have no recourse.-' The judicial process offers only
a highly important characteristic of administrative procedure: delegation. The large
staff of an agency, the many duties which the agency is called upon to perform, the
necessity of harmonizing its affirmative responsibility for results with its equally im-
portant duty of deciding correctly as between the parties in each particular case, and
the practical need for the fullest possible utilization of its special skills and expertness-
each of these calls for internal organization which involves an allocation of functions
among the members and staff of the agency.
"For it becomes obvious at once that the major work of the heads of an agency is
normally supervision and direction. They cannot themselves be specialists in all phases
of the work, but specialists must be immediately available to them. They cannot them-
selves receive material which must be filed and analyse it. They cannot, and they
should not, conduct investigations, determine in every instance whether or not action
is required, hear controversies, and at the same time make all the decisions. Adminis-
trative procedures must be founded upon the reality that many persons in the agency
other than the heads must do the bulk of this work." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 20 et seq.
320p. cit. supra note 2, at 219 n.; and op. cit. supra note 16, at 1378.
330p. cit. supra note 2, at 35 et seq. As a matter of fact, the simpler course for ad-
ministrators is either to insist upon formal procedures at every step or to do away with
all procedure. The latter is usually the practice in purely executive functions. The
former makes it possible for agencies to proceed in stately fashion, whatever the views
of the parties or the exigencies of cost or time. The citation given above sets forth the
somewhat general practice of agencies to insist upon a hearing of facts even where the
parties who are solely concerned are only too willing to admit the facts.3 4
"Because the agencies have required the person who heard the evidence to play a
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an incomplete guide in this situation in the form of the ill-defined roles
of law clerks and masters in chancery or referees.
But, beyond these rather general differences in the administrative sys-
tem as compared with the judicial, another phase of the application of
the false standard is the tendency to search the judicial system for loose
forms which allow a maximum freedom of action to the administrative
branch, no matter how unjust such transplanted forms may be. Ordinarily
these are found in the judicial chamber of horrors, more commonly known
as the criminal law.85 Thus, not merely have we come to imitate judicial
forms, but we select the worst we can find because they suit a particular
purpose. Here, again, a few of the more general examples will suffice:
First and foremost is the problem of notice to private parties. The
Congress, out of an understandable desire to leave administrative agencies
free ot develop their own rules and principles, has conferred jurisdiction
in broad statutory language. 'At the same time, it has long been
recognized in the judicial field that complaints or indictments may be
phrased "in the language of the statute."36  Agencies, therefore, have
more or less subordinate role in deciding, they have had to use other instrumentalities
for shaping a decision. Intermediate reports, exceptions thereto, and oral arguments
on the exceptions are the mechanical devices which are usually employed; staffs of
review attorneys or review examiners and the like have been created as aids. Some
agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board, have established large sections of
attorneys isolated from other staff members to analyze the record and prepare decisions
in accordance with the Board's directions. Others, such as the Federal Communications
Commission, have relied for analysis and assistance upon members of their legal staffs,
who collate the recommendations and suggestions of other staff members in the technical
divisions. Whatever form of organization may be employed, almost invariably the agency
heads rely heavily upon subordinates other than the hearing officer to digest the record
and to draft findings and opinions in accordance with the directions of the agency. * * *
"The agency heads cannot read the voluminous records and winnow out the essence
of them. Consequently, this task must be delegated to subordinates. Competent as these
anonymous reviewers or memorandum writers may be, their entrance makes for loss
of confidence. Parties have a sound desire to make their arguments and present their
evidence, not to a monitor, but to the officer who must in the first instance decide or
recommend the decision. In many agencies attorneys rarely exercise the privilege of
arguing to the hearing officer. They have no opportunity to argue to the record analysts
and reviewers who have not heard the evidence but whose summaries may strongly affect
the final result." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 45, 46.35Well aware of the political and oppressive nature of the English criminal law,
early America, once independence was achieved, rejected it. See, for example, CUmmINGS
AND McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE-CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE (1937) 463 et seq. But the pitfalls and injustices of modern American
criminal law, which of all fields of the law remains most completely judicial in form,
are now occasionally noted even by courts. Such a reference is to be found in the proceed-
ings of the Judicial Conference in 1922 wherein the arbitrary, harsh, and prejudicial
nature of the law of criminal conspiracy is discussed [see United States v. Eisenminger,
16 F. (2d) 816, 821 (D. Del. 1926)].
S6Sometimes administrative agencies have attempted to justify this practice of vague
notice upon the basis of the barbarous and oppressive rule of the law of criminal con-
spiracy. See, for example, the discussion in Securities and Exchange Commission,
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taken the broad language of statutes delegating authority as the language
of their orders to show cause, their complaints, and their notices. The
result has been that statutes devised to confer powers have been utilized,
in accordance with the judicial rule, to give vague and often meaningless
notice of charges.3 7 How can a citizen know what is charged i'f he is
summoned to "show cause why" his license or permit should not be re-
voked "in the public interest"? To be sure, he knows the details of his
business and may study the scanty substantive law, but the whole pro-
ceeding may continue even to its termination without his knowing just
what phase of his activities some administrator suspects is unlawful.
Second, the application of rules of evidence offers a curious twist to
the administrative theme. There is much talk of doing away with "tech-
nicalities" in the administrative process; and to this extent, at least,
the judicial form generally is supposed to be superseded.3 s  As a matter
of fact, however, the reading of almost any administrative record in a
contested case will disclose that counsel not infrequently indulge success-
fully in every technicality to prevent the proof of facts. But, more im-
portant, where administrative functions include the grant of privileges,
exceedingly detailed, rigid, and legalistic requirements are laid down
Monograph of Committee on Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. 10, Pt. 13, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., 46. But, whatever the basis for justification, in either case the result is in-
sufficient notice in a field which ought to be just and fair.
_
37"There are certain criteria of fairness in the hearing process which, in the absence of
clear evidence of inapplicability in particular circumstances, should regularly be observed.
Before adverse action is to be taken by an agency, whether it be denying privileges to an
applicant or bounties to a claimant, before a cease-and-desist order is issued or privileges
or bounties are permanently withdrawn, before an individual is ordered directly to alter
his method of business, or before discipline is imposed upon him, the individual im-
mediately concerned should be apprised not only of the contemplated action with
sufficient precision to permit his preparation to resist, but, before final action, he should
be apprised of the evidence and contentions brought forward against him so that he
may meet them. * * *
"A ... prerequisite to fair formal proceedings is that when formal action is begun, the
parties should be fully apprised of the subject-matter and issues involved. Notice, in short
must be given; and it must fairly indicate what the respondent is to meet. * * *
"Room remains for considerable improvement in the notice practices of many agencies.
* * Too frequently, this notice is inadequate. * * * The applicant is put to his proof on
such broad issues as public interest, convenience, and necessity. * * * Agencies not
infrequently set out their allegations in general form, perhaps in statutory terms, thus
failing fully to apprise the respondents and to permit them adequately to prepare their
defenses." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 62-63; and see pp. 234-235 n. Also op. cit. mtpra
note 16, at 1392-1393.3 8For example: "Although administrative agencies may be freed from observance of
strict common law rules of evidence for jury trials, it is erroneous to suppose that
agencies do not, as a result, observe some 'rules of evidence.' Even in the disbursing
agencies such as the Veterans' Administration and the Railroad Retirement Board, where
the greatest degree of liberality is necessitated in order to permit the claimant to present
his case, the regulations embody extensive rules governing the modes of proving such
crucial issues as birth, death, service, and the like." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 70.
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by agencies themselves, and all applicants must conform. Here, only too
often, technicalities are compounded rather than reduced, all upon a firm
foundation of legalisms drawn from the common law. While it is true
that the large corporation or the well-to-do citizen may shoulder this
burden through counsel, many people must turn away because of the
sheer burden of technicalities. 9
Third, the methods of presentation of evidence ape judicial forms to
the extent of precluding, even where no one objects, the presentation of
written evidence. If notice were specific and if the presentation of au-
thenticated statements were authorized, many expensive trials would be
obviated. The traditional question and answer method obviously is ill-
suited where matters are uncontested or where mere technical compila-
tions and data are required. Here, however, administrative agencies have
hesitated to devise procedures 40 merely because, it would seem, the judi-
cial arm offers no familiar parallel.
Fourth, drawing heavily from judicial practice, administrative agencies
either write no opinions to accompany their judgments, or they write
long and rambling discourses which fill volume after volume of reports
to the extent that sometimes it is a labor of many hours to read and un-
derstand a single decision. Here agencies blindly draw upon the judicial
parallel both to give reasons for their decisions41 and to obfuscate their
reasons. Obviously, the no-opinion certiorari practice of the Supreme
Court is not applicable to the work of many agencies; and the endless
restatement of prior decisions which pads so many court reports only
increases the public and private cost of administrative justice.
IV
It ought to be clear that-despite the writing and speech-making and
despite the wise limitation of current inquiry to matters of procedure-we
are still very far from an objective and fair standard. So long as we
assume that the administrative system is the same as the judicial in its
general form, and so long as we use the judicial scrap bag from which to
draw methods or practices, regardless of their essential merit, we are
applying a false standard to administrative law. Imitation is not fairness,
and certainly appropriation of the exceptional barbarities of the courts
is not justice.
3 9The burden is quite as much one of piling up document after document, to say nothing
of the technical details as to each document.4 00p. cit. supra note 2, at 40-41, 64-68, 69-70.
41 0p. cit. supra note 2, at 29-30. See also: Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COL.
L. REv. 103, 108, 109 (1914); DAVIES, THE FEDERAL TRADE Commissiox (1924), Ch. III
and pp. 334-337; Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74, 86, 51 Sup.
Ct. 1, 5 (1930).
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